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I.

INTRODUCTION
The Solyndra congressional investigation prompted an inter-branch
struggle over President Obama’s withholding of information. One-time
presidential candidate Michelle Bachmann went so far as to call Solyndra
a “historic scandal” worse than Watergate.1 However, unlike Watergate,
the Solyndra investigation did not lead to a constitutional showdown
between the branches of government. Rather, the White House engaged
in the sort of give-and-take with Congress that the Constitution
encourages. On the other hand, the congressional subcommittee
investigating the Solyndra controversy fell short of the good-faith
negotiation envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution.
This article examines the Solyndra Congressional investigation as a
case study in how the executive and legislative branches should fulfill
their constitutional roles while negotiating over access to information.
The article concludes by suggesting a legal standard that a court could
have used if this inter-branch conflict had been litigated in federal court.
II. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE & THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO
INVESTIGATE
The text of the Constitution does not explicitly mention executive
privilege.2 Similarly, no constitutional language clearly authorizes
Congress to subpoena information from the executive branch.3 Rather,
the Supreme Court has held that the prerogatives of presidential
confidentiality and congressional inquiry are rooted in the Constitution’s
system of checks and balances.4 Of course, the interests of presidential
confidentiality and congressional accountability are often in tension. The
following subsections will examine how the Framers approached this
tension and explain how the Supreme Court has reconciled these
competing interests.

1 Christian Heinze, Bachmann: Solyndra is Worse than Watergate, THE HILL (Nov. 18,
2011, 1:38 PM), http://gop12.thehill.com/2011/11/bachmann-solyndra-is-worse-than.html.
2 In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
3 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (finding that the Congress’ power to
conduct oversight is inherent in its power to legislate).
4 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712–13 (1974); Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 175.
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A. The Framers’ Perspective
The Framers created a system that recognized the competing
interests of presidential confidentiality and congressional accountability.
They understood that the President needed a degree of confidentiality to
make informed decisions.5 At the same time, the Framers did not intend
for the President to have absolute confidentiality and therefore, equipped
Congress with the power to oversee the White House.6
The Framers feared a tyrannical executive and wanted Congress to
be the strongest of the three branches.7 Federalist 51 explains that “[i]n
a republican [form of] government, the legislature necessarily
predominates.”8 Based upon lessons from history under the British
monarchs, the country’s founders understood the dangers of an
uncontrolled executive and wanted the legislature to investigate
wrongdoing in the executive branch.9 At the Constitutional Convention,
George Mason said that Congress possessed not just legislative power,
but also “inquisitorial powers” and must “meet frequently to inspect the
Conduct of the public offices.”10
The Framers believed that the competing interests of presidential
confidentiality and congressional accountability could coexist in a system
of separated powers because each political branch would fight to protect
their own prerogatives against encroachment by the other.11 Federalist
47 refers to such a system of checks and balances as an “invaluable
precept in the science of politics.”12
Indeed, the tension between presidential confidentiality and
congressional accountability goes as far back as the presidency of George
Washington.13 In 1794, the Senate requested copies of correspondence
5 THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay) (recognizing that the Constitution entrusts the
President with certain matters that require “secrecy”).
6 LOUIS FISCHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 5 (2004).
7 MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 11–12 (3d ed. 2010).
8 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison).
9 ROZELL, supra note 7, at 11.
10 2 THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (Max Farrand,
ed., 1966).
11 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2003) (“Ambition
must be made to counteract ambition.”).
12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).
13 Stephen L. Carter, Obama Should Still Resist Congress on Solyndra, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 10, 2011, 10:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-11/obama-shouldstill-resist-congress-on-solyndra-stephen-carter.html.
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between the French government and the United States ambassador.14
Washington believed that disclosing such correspondence would harm
the public interest.15 After consulting with his Cabinet, Washington
decided that he could constitutionally withhold some of the information.16
Washington wrote to the Senate to let them know that he was sending
copies of the correspondence “except in those particulars [which] in [his]
judgment, for public considerations, ought not to be communicated.”17
The first Congress never challenged Washington on this withholding of
information, thus creating the precedent that the executive could refuse
to disclose communications if the purpose was to protect the secrecy of
communications and such a goal was in the public’s interest.18
As was the case in the Washington example, most executive
privilege disputes regarding access to information are resolved
informally without the need for litigation.19 However, as the next section
explains, some disputes have found their way into federal court, thus
shaping the legal contours of executive privilege.20
B. Judicial Interpretation
The leading case on executive privilege is United States v. Nixon in
which President Nixon invoked executive privilege when Watergate
Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski sought access to tape recordings of
Nixon’s conversations with White House advisors.21 President Nixon
argued that he had absolute immunity from requests for information from
a grand jury.22 In fact, Nixon’s attorney, James D. St. Clair claimed that
the “[P]resident want[ed] [him] to argue that he [wa]s as powerful a
monarch as Louis XIV, only four years at a time, and [wa]s not subject
to the processes of any court in the land.”23
14

ROZELL, supra note 7, at 30–32.
Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Neil Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest
Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 115 (1996).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dep’t of
Justice, 365 F3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2004); In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United
States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Senate Select Comm. on
Presidential Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
21 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 683.
22 Id. at 686.
23 Samuel Dash, Morality in American Politics: Is it Possible? 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 773, 781
15
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The Court in Nixon made it clear that there was not an unqualified
presidential privilege. The Court held that executive privilege is a
qualified privilege that can be outweighed by countervailing needs.24 The
Court applied a balancing test, weighing the grand jury’s need for
information against the President’s need for confidentiality.25 The Court
acknowledged the importance of executive branch confidentiality, noting
that a President should receive candid advice from White House
advisors.26 However, concern about the public disclosure of advisors’
communications could force advisors to hold back their advice.27 The
Court opined that advisors who “expect public dissemination of their
remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for
their own interests to the detriment of the decision-making process.”28
Nonetheless, the Court held that the grand jury’s need for important
evidence in a criminal investigation outweighed President Nixon’s need
for confidentiality.29
A number of District of Columbia Circuit cases, such as In re Sealed
Case (“Espy”), have put flesh on the bones of executive privilege
jurisprudence.30 Like Nixon, Espy arose out of a claim of executive
privilege against a grand jury’s request for information.31 President
Clinton asserted the privilege against Independent Counsel Donald
Smaltz’s subpoena for materials used to prepare a White House Counsel’s
Office (“Counsel’s Office”) report, responding to allegations that
Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy had accepted inappropriate benefits.32
The District of Columbia Circuit found that the privilege should apply
only to communications “authored or solicited and received” by the
President’s staff members who have “broad and significant
responsibility” for offering advice to the President on the matter to which
the communications relate.33 Such a holding is relevant because it will
later be analyzed and applied to the Solyndra conflict along with the
(2001).
24 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 684–85.
25 Id. at 711–12.
26 Id. at 708.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 705.
29 Id. at 713.
30 In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
31 Id. at 729.
32 Id. at 734–35.
33 Id. at 758.

CRAWFORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

1/19/2015 2:11 PM

[Vol. 39:1

potential consequences that could have arisen had the conflict been
litigated in federal court.
Just as a grand jury’s need to obtain relevant evidence in a criminal
trial can outweigh executive privilege, the legislature’s need for
information can also outweigh the President’s need for confidentiality.
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress requires information
from the executive branch to fulfill its constitutional duties to legislate
and provide oversight.34 In the leading case of McGrain v. Daugherty,35
the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress’ power to conduct oversight
is inherent in its power to legislate, finding that a “legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.”36
Furthermore, history has shown that congressional committees play an
important role in uncovering wrongdoing in the executive branch from
the Teapot Dome scandal to the Hurricane Katrina congressional
hearings.37
As a general matter, courts are reluctant to get involved in interbranch disputes between the executive and the legislature.38 As a result,
the political branches must negotiate with each other over access to
information. This sort of inter-branch back-and-forth occurred in the
Solyndra investigation, but as the following section explains, the White
House was more faithful to the guidance of the Nixon Court to resolve
“competing interests” in a manner that “preserves the essential functions
of each branch.”39

34

Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187–88 (1957).
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
36 Id.
37 Ensuring Executive Branch Accountability: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 26–31 (2007)
(statement of John Podesta, President, Ctr. for Am. Progress).
38 TODD GARVEY & ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL42670, PRESIDENTIAL
CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE, AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, 1
(2012).
39 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
35
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III. THE SOLYNDRA INVESTIGATION
The Department of Energy (“DOE”) announced in March 2009 that
it would offer a conditional $535 million loan guarantee to Solyndra, a
manufacturer of solar panels based in Fremont, California, to finance the
construction of a solar panel manufacturing plant.40 Solyndra was the first
company to receive support through the DOE Loan Guarantee Program
created under the Bush administration as part of the Energy Policy Act of
2005.41 President Obama expanded the program as part of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.42
In May 2010, President Obama was scheduled to visit one of
Solyndra’s existing plants in California on a trip to highlight his green
energy agenda.43 Some Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”)
employees worried about the financial stability of the company.44
Prophetically, these officials feared that President Obama’s visit would
come back to haunt the administration if Solyndra failed.45 However,
after reviewing the matter, the White House decided to proceed with the
trip as planned.46 Months later, Solyndra’s financial difficulties became
apparent when the company cancelled an initial public offering.47 In the
fall of 2010, Solyndra closed one of its existing plants and postponed the
expansion of the manufacturing facility that was built using the DOE loan
guarantee.48
In February 2011, DOE generated controversy when it restructured
the Solyndra loan.49 The terms specified that private entities would be
40 Andrew Restuccia, All About Solyndra: A Short Primer, THE HILL (Nov. 26, 2011,
3:15 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/195481-all-about-solyndra-a-shortprimer-on-the-controversy.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Restuccia, All About Solyndra, supra note 40.
47 Solyndra Cancels IPO Plans, Instead Sells Debt, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June
18, 2010, 7:34 AM),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9GDLJAG0.htm.
48 Energy & Commerce Leaders Probe OMB or Role in DOE Stimulus Loan Guarantees,
Risky Half Billion Award to Solyndra a Top Concern, HOUSE ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM.
(Mar. 14, 2011), http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/energy-commerce-leadersprobe-omb-role-doe-stimulus-loan-guarantees-risky-half-billion.
49 Andrew Stiles, GOP to WH: Stop Stonewalling Us on Solyndra Docs, NAT’L. REV.
ONLINE (Dec. 1, 2011, 7:24 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/284679/gop-whstop-stonewalling-us-solyndra-docs-andrew-stiles.
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repaid before the federal government if the company defaulted.50 The
loan restructuring prompted the Oversight and Investigations
Subcommittee (“Subcommittee”) of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee (“Committee”) to launch a probe of the loan guarantee in
February 2011.51 The Chairman of the Committee, Fred Upton (R-MI)
and the Chairman of the Subcommittee, Cliff Stearns (R-FL) led the
Solyndra investigation.52 The Committee intensified its investigation
after Solyndra declared bankruptcy in August 2011.53
In September 2011, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)
raided Solyndra’s offices.54 Photos of FBI agents emerging from
Solyndra headquarters ran in newspapers across the country and
suggested that a political scandal might be brewing for President
Obama.55 In an effort to ameliorate the Solyndra fallout, White House
Chief of Staff Bill Daley announced an independent review of the Energy
Department’s loan guarantee portfolio.56 Nonetheless, it was clear that
the Subcommittee intended to ratchet up the political pressure on the
White House.

50 Joe Stephens & Carol D. Leonnig, Solyndra Loan Deal: Warning about Legality Came
from Within Obama Administration, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/solyndra-obama-and-rahm-emanuel-pushed-tospotlight-energy-company/2011/10/07/gIQACDqSTL_story.html.
51 Andrew Restuccia & Ben Geman, Second Green Flop Stokes Controversy, THE HILL
(Nov. 1, 2011, 12:36 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/190915-secondgreen-flop-stokes-controversy.
52 Darren Samuelsohn, Right Nips Fred Upton on Solyndra Handling, POLITICO (Dec. 7,
2011, 11:55 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/70043.html#ixzz1pg9Egv3S.
53 Andrew Restuccia & Ben Geman, White House Gives Up More Solyndra Docs, THE
HILL (Feb. 3, 2012, 11:45 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/208653-amidcomtempt-threat-white-house-sends-gop-more-solyndra-docs.
54 Joe Stephens & Carol D. Leonnig, FBI Searches Offices of Solyndra; Lawmakers Say
They were Misled about Firm’s Finances, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/fbi-searches-shuttered-solyndra-offices-plant-incalifornia/2011/09/08/gIQAu4kRCK_story.html.
55 The Solyndra Scandal: The FBI Raids a Beneficiary of Federal Loan Guarantees,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111904836104576558763644374614.
56 Scott Wilson, White House Orders Review of Energy Department Loans Amid
Solyndra Fallout, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-orders-independent-review-of-energydepartment-loans/2011/10/28/gIQASsrPQM_story.html.
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A. The Subcommittee’s Duty to Investigate Solyndra
Upton and Stearns had a responsibility to obtain information about
the Solyndra loan guarantee. The Solyndra investigation fell squarely
under their purview, as Chairmen of the Committee and the
Subcommittee, both Representatives held jurisdiction over the affordable
energy and DOE programs.57 Furthermore, the legislation that had created
the loan guarantee program had originated in the Committee.58
The Supreme Court has held that Congress possesses the
constitutional authority to compel disclosure when the investigation is “in
aid of legislation.”59 Clearly, the Solyndra investigation met this standard.
Not only had Solyndra received $535 million of taxpayers’ money, but
also the Solyndra loan received was part of a DOE program that had
issued over ten billion dollars in loan guarantees.60 Therefore, problems
with the Solyndra loan could be symptomatic of larger problems with the
green energy loans program. The Subcommittee also had legitimate
concerns that Solyndra might have received a loan because of the
company’s financial ties to one of President Obama’s fundraisers, George
Kaiser.61 This was precisely the type of situation in which the Framers
wanted Congress to hold the President accountable. As George Mason
said at the Constitutional Convention, members of Congress must “meet
frequently to inspect the Conduct of the public office.”62 As such, the
Subcommittee had a right to information from the executive branch and
a duty to investigate the matter.
Inter-branch conflicts are a normal byproduct of the separation of
powers principle, and yet, the Framers expected Congress and the
President to resolve “conflicts in scope of authority” in the way most
57 Letter from Rep. Fred Upton, Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, & Rep. Cliff
Stearns, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, Comm. on Energy &
Commerce to Kathryn H. Ruemmler, Counsel to the President (Feb. 9, 2012), available at
http://burgess.house.gov/uploadedfiles/02.09.2012_letter_to_white_house_counsel_kathryn
_ruemmler_and_cynthia_hogan.pdf.
58 Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 109th Cong. (2005).
59 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 295 (1929).
60 Sean Higgins, DOE Mulls Green Energy Loans at $23 Million per Job, INVESTOR’S
BUS. DAILY (Sept. 27, 2011, 5:59 PM),
http://news.investors.com/article/586155/201109271759/doe-mulls-green-energy-loans-at23-million-per-job.htm.
61 Neela Banerjee, House to Probe Failed Energy Company Solyndra at Hearing, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/12/news/la-pn-solyndra-hearing20110912.
62 2 THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (Max Farrand,
ed., 1966).
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likely to “result in efficient and effective functioning of our governmental
system.”63 Therefore, the Subcommittee appropriately sent letters to the
DOE requesting documents and related information rather than
immediately issuing subpoenas, which would have caused the conflict to
quickly escalate. The Subcommittee also requested information from
OMB, which reviewed and approved the credit subsidy costs of the DOE
loan guarantee.64
The Subcommittee also exercised prudence by limiting the scope of
the investigation to decisions made at the agency level as opposed to
immediately requesting information from the White House. Judicial
precedent suggests that the rationale for executive privilege is strongest
when applied to the Office of the President, but this rationale is less
applicable to communications at the agency level.65 Thus, the
Subcommittee did not infringe on the President’s prerogative when it
requested information from the agencies.
The focus of the Solyndra investigation shifted from the agencies to
the White House after the Subcommittee reviewed emails suggesting that
the White House may have exerted political pressure on budget officials
to approve the loan guarantee.66 The communications showed that White
House officials repeatedly checked with OMB to see if the loan was
approved, in anticipation of a groundbreaking event in September 2009,
at which Vice President Biden intended to announce the loan approval.67
In the emails, some OMB employees complained of pressure from the
White House to review the loan.68 One budget official referred to “the
time pressure we are under to sign-off on Solyndra.”69 Consequently, the
Subcommittee sought communications between White House officials
and the agencies to determine the extent of the White House’s

63

United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Orrin G.
Hatch, Avoidance of Constitutional Conflicts, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1025, 1027–28 (1987).
64 Saqib Rahim, Republicans Say DOE Had Multiple Signs That Solyndra Was Failing,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/09/13/13climatewirerepublicans-say-doe-had-multiple-signs-that-63664.html.
65 Judicial Watch Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
66 Joe Stephens & Carol D. Leonnig, Solyndra Loan: White House Pressed on Review
of Solar Company Now Under Investigation, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-pushed-500-million-loan-to-solarcompany-now-under-investigation/2011/09/13/gIQAr3WbQK_story.html.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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involvement as critical decisions were being made about the loan.70
B. The White House Accommodates the Subcommittee’s Initial
Request
At this point in the investigation, the White House properly chose to
accommodate the Subcommittee’s request for information. Inter-branch
conflicts are a natural part of our constitutional system, but these conflicts
must be approached with a “spirit of dynamic compromise.”71 The White
House chose the right course by fulfilling its constitutional mandate to
work with the legislative branch.
The White House could have argued that communications between
the White House and the agencies were covered by executive privilege.
To be sure, other presidents have argued that executive privilege applies
broadly within the executive branch.72 The Clinton administration
claimed that all communications between the White House and federal
agencies were presumptively privileged.73 However, it would have been
politically untenable for the White House to invoke executive privilege
at this stage in the investigation, and it is doubtful that a court would have
upheld the privilege.
Not all types of executive branch communications are protected
equally. Courts have divided the broader category of executive privilege
into sub-categories, such as the “deliberative process privilege” and the
“presidential communications privilege.”74 The deliberative process
privilege protects “predecisiononal” executive branch communications,
while
the
presidential
communications
privilege
protects
communications by only the President and his top advisors.75 A top
advisor is defined as someone who works in “operational proximity” to
the President.76 The presidential communications privilege covers both

70 Emails Show White House Pressure Ahead of Solar Company Loan Approval, FOX
NEWS (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/13/gop-to-hold-hearingon-now-bankrupt-solar-company-that-obama-once-touted/.
71 Ensuring Executive Branch Accountability: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 41 (2007)
(statement of Beth Nolan, Former White House Counsel) (quoting United States v. Am. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
72 Carter, supra note 13.
73 GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 38, at 8.
74 In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 737–40 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
75 Id. at 743 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974)).
76 Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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pre-deliberative and post-decisional materials.77
The presidential
communications privilege is grounded in the separation of powers and is
more difficult to overcome.78 The deliberative process privilege is
grounded in the common law and presents a lower bar for parties seeking
information from the executive.79
The White House could have attempted to withhold sensitive
communications under the presidential communications privilege. The
Subcommittee requested communications between agency officials and
White House staff prior to President Obama’s May 2010 visit to a
Solyndra plant.80 The Subcommittee was especially interested in
communications from top administration officials, such as White House
Senior Advisor, Valerie Jarrett and Vice-President Biden’s Chief of Staff,
Ron Klain.81 Under the precedent set by Espy, the White House could
have argued that the presidential communications privilege applied
because Jarrett and Klain “solicited and received” the email
communications.82 Under Espy, these two officials had “broad and
significant responsibility” for investigating and formulating the advice on
Solyndra for the President.83
Even though the presidential communications privilege might have
applied, the White House made the right decision not to invoke it. In
order to invoke the presidential communications privilege, the White
House would need to draw attention to the fact that two of President
Obama’s top aides, Valerie Jarrett and Ron Klain, solicited the
communications about Solyndra. The fact that two top aides were so
interested in Solyndra would suggest that the White House harbored
concerns about Solyndra before the President’s trip. Thus, invoking the
presidential communications privilege was politically untenable at a time
when the White House was attempting to distance itself from the
77

Espy, 121 F.3d at 745.
Id.
79 Id.
80 Committee Approves Subpoena After White House Fails to Turn Over Internal
Solyndra Documents, HOUSE ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM. (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/committee-approves-subpoena-after-whitehouse-fails-turn-over-internal-solyndra#sthash.KZ1AA6aV.dpuf.
81 Committee Prepares to Seek Subpoena of White House Documents, HOUSE ENERGY &
COMMERCE COMM. (Oct. 28, 2011),
http://energycommerce.house.gov/News/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=9055 [hereinafter
Subpoena].
82 Espy, 121 F.3d at 752.
83 Id.
78
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decisions that were made about Solyndra.
The White House also could have invoked the deliberative process
privilege, but such an attempt would likely be unsuccessful. As noted
above, the deliberative process privilege is rooted in the common law,
and it is easier to overcome.84 The Solyndra investigation was a legitimate
area of congressional oversight. If the battle over information ended up
in court at this stage in the investigation, a judge would have to balance
the interests of confidentiality against accountability and would likely
determine that Congress’ right to information was enough to overcome
executive privilege.
C. Request for Internal White House Communications Escalates
the Conflict
Up until this point, the Subcommittee had respected the President’s
prerogatives while fulfilling its own constitutional duty to conduct
oversight. This all changed, however, when the Subcommittee asked for
all internal White House communications regarding Solyndra.85 The
Subcommittee’s request presented a major logistical challenge because
the Counsel’s Office would need to sort through every email that
mentioned the word “Solyndra.”86 More importantly, the request impeded
on the President’s prerogative to keep his advisors’ communications
confidential. The White House likely felt that the Subcommittee was on
a fishing expedition. Chairman Sterns acknowledged that the subpoena
was broad and said in an interview that he thought the subpoena would
even cover communications on President Obama’s BlackBerry.87
Therefore, it was no surprise that White House Counsel, Kathryn
Ruemmler told the Subcommittee that the White House could not comply
with such an overly broad information request.
Ruemmler did not invoke executive privilege, but she alluded to the

84

Id. at 745.
Joe Stephens & Carol D. Leonnig, Solyndra: House Panel Subpoenas Internal White
House Documents, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/solyndra-house-panel-subpoeas-white-house-forfirst-time/2011/11/03/gIQAtmjjiM_story.html.
86 Andrew Restuccia, White House Delivers Solyndra Documents, Rebuffs Full GOP
Subpoena, THE HILL (Nov. 11, 2011, 10:23 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energyenvironment/193169-white-house-provides-solyndra-documents-rebuffs-subpoena-request.
87 Darren Samuelsohn, GOP Solyndra Probe Wants Obama’s Blackberry Messages,
POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2011, 4:06 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/65361.html.
85
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prerogative in her response.88 She wrote that the Subcommittee’s request
“implicates longstanding and significant institutional Executive Branch
confidentiality interests.”89 Ruemmler also drew upon the language of
several District of Columbia Circuit cases when she wrote that the
Subcommittee did not articulate how the requested materials were
“demonstrably critical” to the Subcommittee’s investigation.90 Ruemmler
gently reminded the Subcommittee that they would need to be far more
specific in their request if they had any hope of overcoming the White
House’s presumptive privilege to keep these communications
confidential.
Ruemmler was right to challenge the Subcommittee’s argument that
internal White House communications were required to understand the
White House’s influence on the agencies during the review of the
Solyndra loan. Communications between the White House and the
agencies offered the best evidence as to whether the White House
asserted political pressure on DOE, OMB, or the Treasury while the
Solyndra loan was under review. As Ruemmler noted, the agencies had
“produced over 70,000 pages of documents, participated in nine briefings
for Committee staff and provided testimony at several Committee
hearings” related to Solyndra.91 Of course, it is not uncommon in
congressional investigations for agencies to respond to requests for
information by overwhelming investigators with documents of marginal
utility.92 However, the Subcommittee did not argue that they were being
flooded with useless documents.
Congress should be circumspect when asking for the
communications of presidential advisors and should only demand
disclosure when it is in the national interest. The Subcommittee had good
reason to disclose communications between the White House and
88 Letter from Kathryn H. Ruemmler, Counsel to the President, to Rep. Fred Upton,
Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, & Rep. Cliff Stearns, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations, Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Items/Solyndra/WHC%20Response.pdf [hereinafter
Response].
89 Id.
90 See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725,
731 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
91 Response, supra note 88.
92 See, e.g., Transcript: Sen. Dianne Feinstein Says CIA Searched Intelligence Committee
Computers, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/transcript-sen-dianne-feinstein-says-cia-searched-intelligence-committeecomputers/2014/03/11/200dc9ac-a928-11e3-8599-ce7295b6851c_story.html.
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agencies, but they had not articulated a strong argument as to why
disclosure of internal White House communications was needed.
D. The Subcommittee Issues White House Subpoenas
The two political branches must make compromises when
negotiating with each other because “accommodation between the two
branches” is contemplated by the Constitution.93 Ruemmler ended her
response to the Subcommittee with a promise that the White House would
continue to cooperate with “legitimate Congressional requests” for
information.94 Despite the White House’s offer to negotiate, Upton and
Stearns announced that they were considering a vote to subpoena the
White House.95 In a joint statement, Upton and Stearns claimed that the
Subcommittee would only authorize subpoenas as a last resort, but said
that the Subcommittee was prepared to take this “serious step” because
of the White House’s “stonewall on Solyndra.”96 Their claim that the
administration was “slow-walking” the investigation seems far-fetched
considering the Subcommittee and the administration reached an
agreement the previous day that DOE Secretary, Steven Chu, would
testify about Solyndra before the Subcommittee.97
Despite the White House efforts regarding accommodation, the
Subcommittee voted to serve subpoenas on White House Chief of Staff,
Bill Daley, and Vice President Joe Biden’s Chief of Staff, Bruce Reed,
for all documents “referring or relating” in any way to Solyndra.98 Issuing
such a broad subpoena may have been a negotiating tactic on the part of
Upton and Stearns, but it was certainly not the type of dynamic
compromise the Framers encouraged. Furthermore, the decision to issue
subpoenas was premature considering that the Subcommittee was still in
the process of negotiating with the White House. Just the previous day,
Ruemmler offered to provide documents if the Subcommittee narrowed
the scope of their request.99
93

United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Response, supra note 88.
95 Subpoena, supra note 81.
96 Subpoena, supra note 81.
97 Darren Samuelsohn, Steven Chu’s Solyndra Testimony Set for Nov. 17, POLITICO (Oct.
27, 2011, 6:22 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/67036.html.
98 Andrew Stiles, WH Rejects House Subpoena for Solyndra Docs, NAT’L. REV. ONLINE
(Nov. 4, 2011, 5:17 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/282343/wh-rejects-housesubpoena-solyndra-docs-andrew-stiles#.
99 Darren Samuelsohn, W.H. To House: Solyndra Subpoenas Seek Too Much, POLITICO
94
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Upton and Stearns should have accepted the White House’s offer to
work with the Subcommittee to respond to a more focused request that
would balance the interests of Congress and the President. The
Constitution requires that the parties work together to resolve their
differences.100 As one court put it, “[c]ompromise and cooperation, rather
than confrontation, should be the aim” of the two political branches.101 In
this instance, the decision to issue subpoenas was aimed at confrontation
rather than cooperation.
Previously, the White House aptly accommodated congressional
requests, but this time, the White House properly pushed back against the
subpoenas. The subpoenas were overly broad and focused on a “general
curiosity” about White House communications.102 The Counsel’s Office
has a responsibility to protect the prerogatives of the Office of the
President.103
As such, Ruemmler appropriately argued that the
Subcommittee’s general curiosity did not justify “encroaching on
longstanding and important Executive Branch confidentiality
interests.”104 To be sure, the White House stood on firm legal ground to
push back against the Subcommittee’s subpoenas, but political reality,
along with the historical and legal precedent, suggested that the White
House had to turn over some documents to show that the White House
was negotiating in good faith.
E. Pressure on the White House to Respond to Subpoenas
The Counsel’s Office wanted to protect the President’s prerogatives,
but Ruemmler likely knew that invoking executive privilege would have
political ramifications. Ever since the Nixon administration, presidents
have been reluctant to invoke executive privilege because of its negative
association with the Watergate scandal.105 Presidents do not want to give
the public the impression that they are invoking executive privilege to
cover up a politically embarrassing controversy.
It is possible that the Subcommittee subpoenaed the White House in
(Nov. 4, 2011, 4:49 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/67654.html.
100 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel Co., 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
101 United States v. House of Representatives of United States, 556 F. Supp. 150, 153
(D.D.C. 1983).
102 Samuelsohn, W.H. To House: Solyndra Subpoenas Seek Too Much, supra note 99.
103 Maryanne Borrelli, Karen Hult & Nancy Kassop, The White House Counsel’s Office,
31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q., 561, 563 (Apr. 21, 2004).
104 Samuelsohn, W.H. To House: Solyndra Subpoenas Seek Too Much, supra note 99.
105 ROZELL, supra note 7, at 121.
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order to force the White House to officially invoke the privilege. A press
release issued by the Subcommittee reads “[w]hile we of course respect
Executive Privilege, the White House Counsel—in two separate letters to
the Subcommittee—has not asserted it.”106 Republicans might have been
pressuring President Obama to assert the privilege to see how he would
respond, since his administration had claimed to run the “most
transparent administration in the history of our country” and invoking the
privilege would make it look like the administration had something to
hide.107
The fact that the Subcommittee lacked bipartisan legitimacy
mitigated the political pressure to disclose internal White House
communications. When Upton and Stearns made the decision to issue
subpoenas, they lost the backing of the Democratic minority, and the vote
to issue subpoenas split along party lines.108 The Committee’s Ranking
Member, Henry Waxman (D-CA), and the Subcommittee’s Ranking
Member, Diana DeGette (D-CO), argued that issuing subpoenas was
unnecessary, and Waxman went so far as to say that the committee’s
leadership was more interested in “confrontation with the president” than
“information for the investigation.”109 This was not simply a situation
where Waxman and DeGette were holding the party line and supporting
the White House. On the contrary, the two Democrats had written to
Stearns after Solyndra declared bankruptcy and asked him to invite
former Solyndra Chief Executive Officer, Brian Harrison, to testify
before the Subcommittee.110 Waxman and DeGette were particularly
troubled by the fact that Harrison had met with the Committee less than
two months earlier and assured them that Solyndra was in a strong
106

Subpoena, supra note 81.
Josh Gerstein and Patrick Gavin, Why Reporters are Down on Obama, POLITICO (Apr.
28, 2010, 4:38 AM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=42A9C609-18FE-70B2A84A2D8F74C77116.
108 White House Counsel Slams House Panel's Solyndra Subpoena, CNN (Nov. 4, 2011,
8:47 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-04/politics/politics_solyndrasubpoena_1_solyndra-loan-guarantee-subpoena-white-house?_s=PM:POLITICS.
109 Andrew Restuccia, House Republicans Vote to Subpoena White House for Solyndra
Documents, THE HILL (Nov. 3, 2011, 2:50 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2wire/191563-house-gop-votes-to-subpoena-white-house-for-solyndra-documents;
White
House Counsel Slams House Panel's Solyndra Subpoena, supra note 108.
110 Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Member, Energy & Commerce Comm., &
Diana DeGette, Ranking Member, Oversight & Investigations Subcomm. to Cliff Stearns,
Chairman, Submcomm. on Oversight & Investigations (Sept. 7, 2011), available at
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=news/ranking-memberswaxman-and-degette-request-solyndra-ceo-testimony.
107
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financial position.111 However, when Stearns and Upton held a vote to
subpoena the White House, they lost the Democrats and the credibility
that comes with a bipartisan investigation.
The White House may have harbored doubts about the strength of
its legal position if the Subcommittee challenged its claim of executive
privilege in court. The President’s right to confidential advice is strongest
when the communications relate to the President’s Article II powers, such
as the Commander-in-Chief power.112 The loan guarantee program was
created as part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, so an executive privilege
claim might not be as convincing in the context of an energy program
created by statute.113
Historical precedent suggests that the White House had to make
concessions to the Subcommittee. The Counsel’s Office generally
attempts to compromise with Congress during inter-branch conflicts
about access to information as part of the natural give-and-take that
occurs in the political process.114 During the Clinton administration, the
Counsel’s Office had a policy of complying with congressional requests
for information “to the fullest extent consistent with the constitutional
and statutory obligations of the Executive Branch.”115 Similarly, the
George H.W. Bush administration said that it would only invoke
executive privilege after the executive had done “the utmost to reach an
accommodation” with Congress.116 Given this precedent, the Counsel’s
Office was under pressure to make some accommodations to the
Subcommittee. As such, the White House turned over 135 pages of
documents that the White House said met the “legitimate oversight
interests” of the Subcommittee.117 Ruemmler informed the Subcommittee
that the White House was withholding about a dozen documents related
to the restructuring of the loan guarantee because of the “deliberative
nature” of the communications.118 However, Ruemmler offered to make

111

Id.
See, e.g., GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 38; ROZELL, supra note 7, at 199.
113 Restuccia, All About Solyndra, supra note 40.
114 GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 38, at 8.
115 Id. at 12.
116 Id. at 12–13.
117 Restuccia, White House Delivers Solyndra Documents, Rebuffs Full GOP Subpoena,
supra note 86.
118 Restuccia, White House Delivers Solyndra Documents, Rebuffs Full GOP Subpoena,
supra note 86.
112
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the documents available to committee staff for review.119 On its face, this
appeared to be a fair concession on the part of the executive without
turning over every document that mentioned Solyndra.
F. The Subcommittee Overreaches and Threatens Contempt Vote
Under the paradigm prescribed by the Constitution, the White House
had met its side of the bargain. The Subcommittee had several options at
this point in the investigation. They could (1) drop the investigation; (2)
file suit in federal district court to seek civil enforcement of the
subpoenas; (3) hold a contempt vote and send the contempt report to the
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia and ask him to press
charges under federal contempt statutes; or (4) continue to negotiate with
the White House and use political pressure to get more information. The
fourth option was likely the best option for the Subcommittee if they
wanted to continue the investigation. The negotiation between the
branches is meant to be a process with a lot of give-and-take, but this
process only works if each side makes accommodations. It does not
appear that the Subcommittee was interested in negotiating in good faith.
Instead, the Subcommittee claimed that the White House had “cherry
picked” certain documents to avoid complying fully with the subpoena,
and the Subcommittee threatened to hold a contempt vote.120
The threat to hold the White House in contempt generated
newspaper headlines, and the press reported on the investigation as an
inter-branch conflict.121 Nevertheless, the threat to hold the White House
in contempt was just as much about intra-branch and intra-party conflicts.
Personality and the personal agenda of members often drive
congressional investigations, and such factors were at play in the
Solyndra investigation. Subcommittee Chairman Stearns made the push
for a contempt vote while Committee Chairman Upton wanted to take a
more cautious approach.122 Upton likely recognized that a contempt vote
could lead to a constitutional showdown with the White House, which he
preferred to avoid.123 As Chairman of the Committee, Upton had the final
say on all matters, but he may have felt that Stearns was positioning
119 Restuccia, White House Delivers Solyndra Documents, Rebuffs Full GOP Subpoena,
supra note 86.
120 Darren Samuelsohn, Cliff Stearns: Contempt of Congress Vote under Consideration,
POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2012, 9:42 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/72203.html.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Samuelsohn, Right Nips Fred Upton on Solyndra Handling, supra note 52.
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himself to challenge Upton for the Committee Chairman position after
the 2012 elections. As such, Upton possibly felt pressure from his right
flank to take a hard stance against the administration.
Upton may have also felt pressure to be aggressive with the
investigation because of a disagreement over congressional jurisdiction.
Soon after Solyndra declared bankruptcy, House Oversight and
Government Reform Chairman, Darrell Issa sent a letter to the White
House requesting information regarding the handling of the Solyndra
loan.124 Upton and Issa praised each other publicly for looking into
Solyndra, but this struggle over jurisdiction created friction between the
two chairmen.125 It is possible that Upton felt political pressure from both
Issa and Stearns to threaten a contempt vote, against his better judgment.
Finally, Upton may have taken a hard line because he recognized that he
was vulnerable to criticism since he once pushed for the DOE to fund a
solar power company in his home state.126
IV. HOW THE CONFLICT WOULD BE VIEWED BY THE COURTS
The Subcommittee’s threat to hold the White House in contempt was
the high point of the inter-branch conflict. Soon after, the White House
turned over 313 pages of internal communications, and the contempt vote
never occurred.127 In June 2012, Chairman Sterns said that the Committee
was “getting closer to getting closure” on the Solyndra investigation, and
the investigation was officially closed in August 2012 when the
Committee released a report in which it referred to Solyndra as a
“cautionary tale.”128 The White House’s decision to turn over 313 pages
of internal communications prevented further escalation, and it is
unknown how the conflict would have been perceived if it had found its
124

Jonathan Strong, A Crowded Line For Solyndra, ROLL CALL (Oct. 18, 2011, 12:00
AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_44/Crowded-Line-for-Solyndra-2095941.html?zkMobileView=true.
125 Id.
126
Steven Mufson & Jia Lynn Yang, Fred Upton, GOP Critic of Solyndra Loan, Sought
Funds for Mich. Solar Firm, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/fred-upton-gop-critic-of-solyndra-loansought-funds-for-mich-solar-firm/2011/11/16/gIQAJKGhSN_story.html.
127 Restuccia & Geman, White House Gives Up More Solyndra Docs, supra note 53.
128 Ben Geman, GOP Probe: Solyndra a “Cautionary Tale,” THE HILL (Aug. 2, 2012,
4:23 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/241869-gop-report-solyndra-collapse-acautionary-tale-of-political-pressures; Andrew Restuccia, Cliff Stearns: ‘Closure’ Near in
Solyndra Investigation, POLITICO (June 27, 2012, 10:42 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77898.html.
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way into federal court. The following section puts forward a legal
standard that a federal court could have followed if the Subcommittee had
sought civil enforcement of the subpoenas.
A. Courts are Reluctant to Intervene in Inter-Branch Disputes
It is rare for inter-branch disputes to end up in the courts because
most controversies regarding the access to information are resolved
through compromises between the executive and legislature.129 Courts
have made clear that the political branches should settle their
disagreements outside of the judicial system.130 In United States v. House
of Representatives, the district court dismissed the case and encouraged
the two branches to “settle their differences without further judicial
involvement.”131 Both the legislative and executive branches typically
prefer to reach an agreement outside of court, presumably in order to
avoid setting judicial precedent.
Even when the executive and legislative branches are prepared to
litigate, they are often kept out of the courts because of restrictions on
standing. In Walker v. Cheney,132 the Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) sought information from the White House on the National
Energy Policy Development Group (“NEPDG”).133 When the GAO was
unable to gain access to the records, the Comptroller General filed suit
against Vice President Cheney in the District Court for the District of
Columbia.134 The court dismissed the case when it found that the GAO
lacked standing.135 Several years later in Committee on House Judiciary
v. Miers,136 the same district court found that the House Judiciary
Committee had standing to bring a civil lawsuit to enforce subpoenas
against White House officials, Harriet Miers and Josh Bolton.137 Thus,
the Miers decision opens the door for future litigation between the
legislative and executive branches.
All three branches may prefer to negotiate inter-branch conflicts
outside of courts, but the judiciary has an important role to play if the
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

ROZELL, supra note 7, at 205.
United States v House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D.D.C. 1983).
Id. at 153.
230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002).
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 75.
558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008).
Id. at 68.
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executive and the legislative branches are unable to reach a resolution.
Some scholars argue that rather than litigating disputes, Congress should
use its own “enforcement mechanisms” when trying to get information
from the executive.138 The legislature could, for example, use its power
of the purse to reduce the budget of a particular department or the Senate
could refrain from confirming nominations.139
History, however, suggests that the courts have an important role to
play in settling disputes between the branches.140 Marbury v. Madison
laid forth the principal that the judiciary has the final authority to
determine whether the President and the legislature are acting within the
powers granted to them by the Constitution.141 Constitutional scholar,
Raoul Berger has criticized the concept of executive privilege, yet even
he argues that Congress cannot “unilaterally decide a boundary dispute
with the Executive, for neither branch, in Madison’s words, has an
exclusive or ‘superior right of settling the boundaries between their
respective powers.’”142 This power of settling boundary disputes is
reserved for the judiciary.143
Finally, the judiciary has itself recognized that it may be required to
mediate these inter-branch disputes.144 As noted above, the district court
in United States v. House of Representatives encouraged the two sides to
negotiate an agreement; however, the court also recognized that it would
be “required to resolve the dispute by determining the validity of the
Administrator’s claim of executive privilege” if the two branches did not
reach a settlement.145
B. What Standard Should a Court Apply?
Currently, it is not clear what legal standard a court would apply
when weighing the President’s claim of executive privilege against
Congress’s request for information. The Supreme Court has not
addressed how this balancing should be done in the congressional-

138 See Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083,
1153 (2009).
139 Id. at 1152.
140 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176–78 (1803).
141 Id.
142 RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 304 (1974).
143 Id.
144 United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.D.C. 1983).
145 Id.
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executive context, so courts have applied different standards.146 For
example, in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon (“Senate Committee”), the District of Columbia
Circuit evaluated whether the requested materials were “demonstrably
critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee’s functions.”147
This article suggests that a court should apply the legal standard
from the Espy decision. In Espy, the District of Columbia Circuit applied
a “specific need” standard when President Clinton asserted executive
privilege against a subpoena issued by a grand jury.148 Building upon the
Nixon Court’s desire to balance the competing interest of confidentiality
and accountability, the District of Columbia Circuit held that a party
would need to meet the two parts of the specific need standard to
overcome executive privilege.149 Under this standard, the party had to (1)
demonstrate that each discrete group of the subpoenaed materials was
likely to contain important evidence and (2) show that the evidence was
not available with due diligence elsewhere.150
Espy explored what is necessary to overcome a claim of executive
privilege in the context of a criminal proceeding, but the specific need
standard should be transported from the grand jury situation and applied
to the congressional-executive context. The same tension between
confidentiality and accountability are at stake in both criminal and
congressional investigations. Indeed, these are the competing values that
the Framers recognized were inherent in a system of checks and balances.
In Espy, the Court of Appeals explicitly said, “we underscore that
our opinion should not be read as in any way affecting the scope of the
privilege in the congressional-executive context.”151 While the Espy court
was clear that it did not wish to opine on the congressional-executive
context, it makes good sense to look to the Espy decision for guidance for
two reasons. First, the majority of executive privilege claims arise in the
grand jury-executive context so the case law is more developed in this
area. Second, the two contexts are analogous in that the court must
mediate the conflicting interests of two political branches in both
circumstances.
146 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Senate Select
Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
147 Nixon, 498 F.2d at 731.
148 Espy, 121 F.3d at 754.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 753.
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The Espy court was not overly prescriptive in describing how much
“need” a grand jury must show to get access to presumptively privileged
material. Certainly, such a test is highly dependent on the facts at hand,
but the court was guided by a desire to balance the constitutionally-based
interests of two branches.152 The court concluded its opinion by writing,
“[w]e believe that the principles we have outlined in this opinion achieve
a delicate and appropriate balance between openness and informed
presidential deliberation.”153 A similar balancing test is needed when the
competing interests of the congressional power of inquiry and executive
branch confidentiality are at odds. A balancing test helps ensure that the
court is protecting the constitutional interests of both the legislature and
the executive.
The specific need standard from Espy does not explicitly tell future
courts how to balance a President’s need for confidentiality against the
public’s interest in transparency. However, an overly prescriptive test is
not desirable. The flexibility of the specific need standard allows courts
to mediate congressional-executive disputes while respecting the
separation of powers doctrine. Indeed, the balancing test gives courts the
ability to apply the standard to different contexts to ensure that the
“constitutionally assigned functions” of the respective branches are
protected.154 For example, Congress would have a higher standard of need
if subpoenaing information pertaining to one of the Article II powers,
such as national security.155 However, a President should not be able to
guard any or all information by claiming that it pertains to national
security. The Espy balancing test provides a route for the courts to
review, in camera, requests for information that the executive has said
pertain to national security.
C. How Would a Court Resolve the Solyndra Conflict?
If the Subcommittee had sought the civil enforcement of the
subpoenas, and a court had applied the Espy standard, the standard would
likely favor the protection of the presidential communications. The
Subcommittee subpoenaed information from the White House Chief of

152

Id.
Id. at 762.
154 Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
155 Espy, 121 F.3d at 748 (identifying the President’s Article II powers and
responsibilities as the constitutional basis of the presidential communications privilege).
153
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Staff and the Vice President’s Chief of Staff.156 Under the standard set
forth in Espy, these officials would qualify as close White House advisors
in “operational proximity” to the President, and so the White House
would stand on solid ground to argue that the presidential communication
privilege should apply.157
Moreover, the Subcommittee would have a difficult task showing
that the privilege should be overcome. Under the Espy standard, the
Subcommittee would need to demonstrate that: (1) each discrete group of
the subpoenaed materials was likely to contain important evidence, and
(2) the evidence was not available with due diligence elsewhere.158 The
Subcommittee was investigating whether the White House exerted
political pressure on budget officials to approve the loan guarantee to
Solyndra. The best evidence of political interference would be
communications between the White House and the agencies, not
communication within the White House. The White House had already
supplied the communications between the White House and the agencies,
so the Subcommittee would have a difficult time meeting the second
prong of the Espy standard, that is, important evidence was not available
with due diligence elsewhere. Since the White House had already turned
over the best evidence, the Subcommittee would be requesting materials
that were merely cumulative. Therefore, the Subcommittee would not
meet the specific need standard and would not overcome the President’s
presumptive privilege.
V. CONCLUSION
When Justice Antonin Scalia was head of the Office of Legal
Counsel in the mid-1970s, he testified before Congress on the subject of
executive privilege. Scalia explained that in inter-branch conflicts, the
resolution is likely to lie in “the hurly-burly, the give-and-take of the
political process between the legislative and executive.”159 In the
Solyndra investigation, the two branches reached a resolution after the
Subcommittee threatened to hold the White House in contempt.160
156

Stiles, WH Rejects House Subpoena for Solyndra Docs, supra note 98.
Espy, 121 F.3d at 752.
158 Id. at 754.
159 Executive Privilege-Secrecy in Government: Hearing on S. 2170, S. 2378, and S. 2420
Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations,
94th Cong. 87 (1975) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen. Office of Legal
Counsel).
160 Restuccia & Geman, White House Gives Up More Solyndra Docs, supra note 53.
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Subsequent disagreements were resolved in a manner consistent with the
separation of powers principle. For example, in mid-February 2012, the
Subcommittee threatened to subpoena five administration officials.161
The White House responded by arranging for the officials to meet with
congressional staff, and the Subcommittee canceled the scheduled
subpoena vote.162 This is exactly the sort of inter-branch negotiation that
should have been occurring throughout the Solyndra investigation.
The resolution to the Solyndra controversy was eventually found in
the “hurly-burly” of the investigation, but if the controversy had found its
way into court, application of the Espy specific need standard would have
allowed the court to balance Congress’ interest in ensuring transparency
against the executive’s interest in secrecy.

161 Darren Samuelsohn, White House Agrees to Let Officials Talk on Solyndra,
POLITICO (Feb. 16, 2012, 5:45 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72999.html#ixzz1oMvmtFMf.
162 Id.

